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Incommensurability and the Bonfire of the Meta-Theories: Response to Mizrahi  
Lydia Patton, Virginia Tech  
 
What is Taxonomic Incommensurability?  
 
Moti Mizrahi states Kuhn’s thesis of taxonomic incommensurability (TI) as follows:  
  
Periods of scientific change (in particular, revolutionary change) that 
exhibit TI are scientific developments in which existing concepts are 
replaced with new concepts that are incompatible with the older concepts. 
The new concepts are incompatible with the old concepts in the following 
sense: two competing scientific theories are conceptually incompatible (or 
incommensurable) just in case they do not share the same “lexical 
taxonomy.” A lexical taxonomy contains the structures and vocabulary 
that are used to state a theory (2015, 2). 
 
Mizrahi cites Kuhn (2000) as a basis for this definition. There, and elsewhere, Kuhn 
repeatedly employs the metaphor of incommensurability from Greek geometry:  
  
The hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle is incommensurable with its 
side[,] or the circumference of a circle with its radius[,] in the sense that 
there is no unit of length contained without residue an integral number of 
times in each member of the pair. There is thus no common measure. But 
lack of a common measure does not make comparison impossible. … The 
claim that two theories are incommensurable [in the context of scientific 
theories] is then the claim that there is no language… into which both 
theories… can be translated without residue or loss (Kuhn 2000, 36). 
 
Prima facie, it’s a terrible metaphor. We can “compare” the circumference of a circle 
with its radius, but we can’t divide the circumference by the radius and get an integer. 
One way to read this is that there is no way to say, for instance, “The circumference of a 
circle divided by its radius is 2y,” where y is a unit of measure.  
 
One might object that of course there’s a unit of measure y such that the circumference of 
a circle divided by its radius is 2y, for instance. Define a unit of measure “y” as C
2r
 , half 
the circumference of a circle divided by its radius. If y = C
2r
 , then 2y = C
r
 . However, that 
move is not possible in ancient Greek geometry, which is synthetic geometry. Analytic 
geometry defines geometrical magnitudes using algebraic variables and functions. 
Synthetic geometry constructs geometrical magnitudes using compass and straightedge. 
You can’t construct a length equal to the circumference of a circle by repeatedly drawing 
a line equal to the radius, or equal to some fraction of the radius. If you draw the radius 
six times, the line will be shorter than the circumference, while if you draw the radius 
seven times, the line will be longer: there will be a deficit (2πr-6r) or a residue (7r-2πr). If 
you define the unit of measure as half the radius (r
2
), and define the magnitude as between 
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6r and 7r, say, 13
2r
, the deficit or residue will decrease but not vanish. You can “compare” 
the two magnitudes by dividing the radius as finely as you wish (r
3
, r
4
, and so on), and as 
the fractions get smaller, you can construct magnitudes closer and closer to 2πr. But 
because π is irrational, you will never be able to construct a magnitude equal to 2πr out of 
radii or segments of radii. The magnitudes C and r are incommensurable in Greek 
geometry. 
 
This is why it’s a terrible metaphor. What’s stated in the previous paragraph is by no 
means common knowledge, and even once you understand the geometrical case, the 
comparison is not direct. Also, both examples involve a famous irrational number (π in 
the circle example, 2 in the triangle case), which confuses the issue. Still, it is possible 
to explain why taxonomic incommensurability is like geometrical incommensurability. In 
fact, the concept “geometrical incommensurability” itself could be read as a taxonomic 
incommensurability that arises when moving from synthetic to analytic geometry.1  
 
For Kuhn, the business of science is problem solving, which takes place according to a 
paradigm that sets the rules of the game.2 In synthetic Greek geometry, the circumference 
of a circle and its radius are incommensurable. You cannot divide the circumference by 
the radius, or by some fraction of the radius, when playing by the rules of ancient Greek 
geometry. But using analytic geometry and real analysis we can remove the 
“incommensurability” from any ratio involving circles and triangles.  
 
To do that is to leave behind the meaning of the word “incommensurability” in ancient 
Greek geometry. The word had that meaning only when playing by the rules of synthetic 
geometry. When moving to analytic geometry, we lose the Greek meaning of 
incommensurability, and that is a taxonomic deficit of analytic with respect to synthetic 
geometry. By doing some violence to the semantic framework, we may be able to 
translate the proposition “A circle’s circumference and radius are incommensurable” into 
the “language” of analytic geometry.3  
 
But that is not the point. The proposition is not provable within the system of analytic 
geometry, and it is provable within the system of synthetic geometry. When the provable 
statements of synthetic geometry are “divided” by the provable statements of analytic 
geometry, it leaves a taxonomic residue. The concept of the geometrical 
incommensurability of certain magnitudes makes sense if you’ve undertaken the project 
of constructing one magnitude out of another, but it doesn’t make the same kind of sense 
if you begin by defining geometrical quantities using variables and functions.4  
 
On Mizrahi’s definition of taxonomic incommensurability, “two competing scientific 
                                            
1 For now, I will bracket the question of whether the change from synthetic to analytic geometry is a 
paradigm shift. 
2 Richardson (2002) explains the idea of playing by the rules more clearly and in more detail. 
3 As Kuhn remarks, Davidson’s claim that incommensurability is a failure of intertranslatability is “literally 
correct but regularly overinterpreted” (2000, 34). 
4 There could be an analogue in analytic geometry, but not the same concept. 
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theories are conceptually incompatible (or incommensurable) just in case they do not 
share the same ‘lexical taxonomy’.” That “just in case” limits incommensurability to a 
lexical feature of the theory. But incommensurability is not necessarily a failure of 
translatability, nor is it merely the change of reference of theoretical terms. These are 
effects of a cause, which is the residue or deficit left when comparing the propositions 
that make sense and are derivable within a theory.  
 
Kinds of Arguments  
 
Mizrahi cites the lack of a strong inductive (section 3) or sound deductive (section 2) 
argument for incommensurability. He concludes from this that there is no argument for 
taxonomic incommensurability. But many influential arguments from the history of 
science are neither inductive nor deductive. They are abductive, or are inferences to the 
best explanation.5   
 
Campos (2011) observes that for Peirce “abductive reasoning is inference to an 
explanatory hypothesis, and this form of reasoning is to be distinguished from induction, 
in which we have already adopted a hypothesis and are only testing its consequences” 
(425, see Peirce 1867). Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis 
about a data set. It involves either coming to see that a previously known law applies to 
the data, or coming up with a law or principle adopted, provisionally, as an explanation of 
the data.6 An inference to the best explanation (IBE) reasons from the fact that a given 
hypothesis is the best (available) explanation of the evidence to the claim that the 
hypothesis is true.  
 
In Mizrahi’s chosen context, philosophical reasoning about the history of science, 
abductive arguments and IBEs flourish. Laudan (1981) describes convergent realism in 
philosophy of science as resting on two “elaborate abductive arguments”. One of these is,  
 
1. If the earlier theories in a ‘mature’ science are approximately true and if 
the central terms of those theories genuinely refer, then later more 
successful theories in the same science will preserve the earlier theories as 
limiting cases;  
 
2. Scientists seek to preserve earlier theories as limiting cases and 
generally succeed; 
 
3. (Probably) Earlier theories in a ‘mature’ science are approximately true 
and genuinely referential (Laudan 1981, 21-2). 
 
It’s not clear why the arguments Laudan cites would be abductive, as others have 
observed. Still, the conclusion (3) could be regarded as a law formulated to explain the 
premises. Or the argument may be a species of IBE: the claim in (3) is described as 
                                            
5 I am grateful to Ben Jantzen for discussion of this. 
6 See Campos 2011, 425-6. 
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probably the best explanation for the facts in (1) and (2). Either way, the argument is 
neither inductive nor deductive.  
 
Laudan’s confutation of convergent realism often is described (though not initially by 
Laudan) as a “pessimistic meta-induction.” Against the optimistic realist abduction, 
Laudan argues that many terms employed in earlier, mature scientific theories do not 
refer (ether, caloric, phlogiston), and that those theories are not approximately true. He 
concludes, realism cannot, even by its own lights, explain the success of those many 
theories whose central terms have evidently not referred and whose theoretical laws and 
mechanisms were not approximately true (47). Laudan’s confutation is an argument 
against a realist inference to the best explanation. It has been construed as a reductio. 
Whatever it is, it is not a straightforward inductive argument.  
 
Hilary Putnam’s no miracles argument is an example of an IBE, as Lipton (2001) 
explains:  
 
Suppose that all the many and varied predictions derived from a particular 
scientific theory are found to be correct: what is the best explanation of 
this predictive success? According to Putnam, the best explanation is that 
the theory itself is true. If the theory were true, then the truth of its 
deductive consequences would follow as a matter of course; but if the 
hypothesis were false, it would be a “miracle” that all its observed 
consequences were found to be correct (191). 
 
Laudan’s confutation and Putnam’s no miracles argument are seminal. Almost every 
paper on scientific realism begins by citing them. Putnam’s no miracles argument is an 
IBE, and so would not be considered an argument under Mizrahi’s a priori classification 
of arguments as inductive, deductive, or not an argument. Laudan’s confutation, if it’s a 
reductio, might be deductive. But Laudan’s conclusion is that realists have not given a 
good explanation of the history of science, so it would still be a deductive argument 
employed to refute an inference to the best explanation.  
 
Many of the most influential arguments in the history and philosophy of science are 
second-order inferences about what we can conclude from the empirical success of 
science. They are explanatory hypotheses, or inferences to the best explanation, that 
cannot be construed as first-order inductive or deductive inferences.  
 
So much the worse for these influential arguments, we might conclude. They should be 
tossed onto the fire with Kuhn’s taxonomic incommensurability argument. Mizrahi will 
get no objections from me, if his goal is to limit grand, speculative, meta-explanatory 
projects based on meager inductive evidence from the history of science. In fact, I read 
Laudan’s 1981 paper as a plea for such limitation, not as an argument for scientific anti-
realism. So perhaps his paper should be saved from the bonfire of the meta-theories.7  
 
                                            
7 I “read” it this way because Laudan says explicitly that that is the point of the paper. 
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What Kind of Argument is Kuhn’s Argument for Taxonomic Incommensurability?  
 
Should Kuhn’s argument be tossed onto the bonfire? Mizrahi argues that there is neither a 
deductive nor an inductive argument proving that Kuhn’s taxonomic incommensurability 
applies to every case of competing scientific theories. The former wouldn’t be a plausible 
reading of Kuhn’s stated views in any case. In the latter case, Mizrahi says “I think that it 
is a mistake to generalize from a few selected examples that competing theories in 
general are taxonomically incommensurable” (2015, 8).  
 
Kuhn and Feyerabend did not argue that every case of competing theories, or of theory 
change, requires taxonomic incommensurability involving meaning or reference variance. 
Kuhn argued that this is only the case with paradigm shifts, and Feyerabend, only with 
paradigm shifts that affect fundamental ontological categories. The class of competing 
theories is much larger than the class of competing paradigms.  
 
Kuhn (2012/1962) defines a paradigm shift as a case in which persistent anomalies, 
discrepancies in the “fit between theory and nature”, come to be seen by scientists as 
obstacles to pursuing research under the existing paradigm (81). The application of the 
paradigm, perhaps to novel evidence, gives rise to the anomaly or anomalies. For an 
episode in science to be a revolution, a paradigm shift, it must involve an anomaly that 
provokes a crisis: a realization among scientists that scientists had been tackling the 
problem from the wrong angle, an increasing tendency to go outside the rules of the 
paradigm when solving problems, and even an increasing lack of consensus about what 
the paradigm is (83).8 Resolving a crisis involves giving up the old paradigm altogether 
and adopting a new one, a new set of rules of the game. By definition, doing so changes 
the conceptual categories, the strategies for puzzle-solving, and the implicit reference of 
scientific terms, associated with the old paradigm.  
 
Kuhn’s invocation of the history of science in his explanatory analysis of the history of 
science is not an inductive argument. Kuhn does not give examples to demonstrate that 
all theory changes are paradigm shifts. He defines a paradigm shift, and then uses that 
definition as a criterion to identify examples. You can argue that a particular theory 
change is not a paradigm shift, even one that Kuhn uses as an example, but that doesn’t 
affect the validity of the definition as part of an abductive, explanatory framework.  
 
In §3.1, Mizrahi gives an account of the case of anastomoses in the history of medicine, 
which  
 
exhibits continuity in terms of the problems practitioners worked on, and 
supplementation in terms of old concepts that were abandoned for a while 
(e.g. anastomoses) but then rediscovered and added to the new theory, 
rather than discontinuity and replacement, as (TI) predicts (2015, 10). 
 
If the problems worked on stayed the same, and if it turned out that an existing concept 
                                            
8 Not every anomaly provokes a crisis. 
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could solve those problems, including anomalies, then the case of anastomoses is not a 
paradigm shift. Dealing with the problems did not provoke a crisis, did not cause 
scientists to question the paradigm itself, and did not cause them to depart from the 
existing paradigm in problem-solving. Mizrahi’s own telling of the history supports the 
claim that the case of anastomoses is a solution to a puzzle within an existing paradigm. 
On Kuhn’s theory, then, there is no requirement of taxonomic incommensurability in this 
case.  
 
Structure relies on inductive evidence only in the context of explanatory hypotheses. The 
reasoning in support of these is abductive and explanatory, not inductive. The idea of a 
paradigm shift is an explanatory hypothesis. To cite examples of problem solving in 
science that are continuous, and that supplement concepts with others, does not affect the 
explanatory framework of paradigm shifts. You could argue against that explanatory 
framework by arguing that the examples Kuhn does give of paradigm shifts and of 
incommensurable theories are not valid examples, which some have done. A knock-down 
argument would require proving that there are no significant, persuasive such examples 
in the history of science.  
 
That reasoning may seem ad hoc. Mizrahi has just given a counterexample, and I have 
said that it doesn’t count as a counterexample because it doesn’t fit the definition of a 
paradigm shift. But that is a legal move on my part: that is how definitions work, in this 
explanatory context.  
 
Is it ethical? It is if Kuhn limited taxonomic incommensurability to paradigm shifts, that 
is, to cases in which dealing with persistent anomalies requires changing paradigms. 
Unfortunately, in his later work, Kuhn does apply the concept beyond the domain in 
which it is justified as an explanatory hypothesis or inference. Mizrahi cites Kuhn (2000), 
which includes an essay on possible worlds in the history of science which links 
taxonomic incommensurability to intensional semantics (58-89). As soon as taxonomic 
incommensurability is divorced from analysis of the proof-structure within paradigms, it 
loses force. Considered as a general claim about linguistic usage in distinct contexts, it is 
unjustified. There, Mizrahi and I may agree.  
 
But Mizrahi links his analysis to Kuhn’s account of the history of science, and Mizrahi 
defines taxonomic incommensurability as arising in cases of revolutionary change (2). In 
the context of scientific revolutions, Kuhn does not argue from particular examples of 
scientific theory change to a general claim that every theory change involves 
incommensurability. Instead, he formulates explanatory hypotheses about those theory 
changes that are demonstrable cases of incommensurability: paradigm shifts.9  
 
I would put Mizrahi’s paper into a broader framework, then, of explaining why Kuhn’s 
                                            
9 In formulating these abductive explanatory hypotheses, Kuhn constructs historical narratives and 
interpretations (Kuhn emphasizes this in The Essential Tension and in Kuhn (2000, 37-40)). But Kuhn’s 
narrative and interpretive methods are employed within an explanatory framework, formulating and testing 
abductive hypotheses against abundant evidence from the history of science. Those who followed Kuhn 
were not always so careful. 
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concept of taxonomic incommensurability is defensible within the framework of the 
analysis of paradigm shifts in science, but not necessarily in the broader contexts in 
which Kuhn and others later used it. Mizrahi blends these two argumentative contexts. I 
would insist on separating them. The force of Kuhn’s argument in Structure is that a 
paradigm that sets the rules of inference and of puzzle solving implicitly limits the 
inferences that can be drawn, the puzzles that can be solved, and even the propositions 
that make sense within that paradigm.  
 
Scientists working within a paradigm must play by the rules of the game of that paradigm 
in solving problems, and that is why incommensurability arises when the rules of the 
game change. If we deny the thesis of the priority of paradigms, then there is no good 
argument for the incommensurability of theories and thus for taxonomic 
incommensurability, because there is no invariant way to determine the set of results 
provable, puzzles solvable, and propositions cogently formulable under a given 
paradigm. I suspect Mizrahi and I agree on this conclusion, but disagree about whether 
the priority thesis is plausible.  
 
I sympathize with Mizrahi’s implied point that meta-theorizing about theory change 
seems to have come unmoored from philosophical argument. If the plan is to consign 
sweeping, inductive meta-narratives to the flames, I will bring the gasoline and 
firecrackers. All I ask is that we take care before we incinerate at least the earlier Kuhn, 
who was pursuing an explanatory, not an inductive project. There are philosophers who 
construct speculative second-order narratives based on the history of science, making a 
meal of a few cherry-picked examples before inhaling the nitrous oxide of best 
explanations. Kuhn is not one of them.10 
 
Contact details: critique@vt.edu 
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